Tracking Donald Trump’s Falling Favorability

Typically, president-elects enjoy a so-called “honeymoon” period in which they see their favorability and approval ratings improve in the months after their election. That phase certainly arrived during the wake of the election, but seems to have already passed as well.

After reaching about as high as a net -5 favorability rating, Trump’s favorability rating has steadily dropped ever since the final week of December. Here’s how the course of his net favorability rating looks since Election Day:

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It hasn’t been a massive dropoff by any means, but the incoming president’s net rating has now sunken below -10. By some accounts, Trump will assume the office of the presidency as the least-liked commander-in-chief in the recorded history of this type of data. His favorability rating is now lower than it was on Election Day.

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Examining Trump’s favorable and unfavorable percentages individually (and not combined in a net rating), as seen above, uncovers another piece of information: though not drastically different, the percentage of people saying they favorably view Trump has dropped more than the percentage saying they unfavorably view Trump has increased. It’s only about a difference of two percentage points since late December, but the movement in Trump’s favorability has more to do with people dropping a favorable perception of him than switching to an unfavorable one.


When one speculates as to why this decline in favorability has occurred, it’s easy and probably correct to point the finger at the cloud of wide-ranging controversies that has followed Trump from during the campaign season and into the pre-inauguration period.

Ties with Russia, other entanglements that could create conflicts of interest, Russia’s role in influencing the election, Cabinet picks and confirmation hearings, and the transition process as a whole represent the most salient negative news and information surrounding Trump that could be driving favorability changes. Plenty of public opinion data has shown low approval of Trump’s transition process, low approval of cabinet choices and appointments, and widespread concern about Trump’s business conflicts of interests, among many other things that could translate to declining favorability once these aspects are thrown into the spotlight. It’s possible that many of the groups that warmed to Trump in the month following the election have now cooled in their subsequent evaluations of the new president.

One other point should also be considered when evaluating this phenomenon–and making sense of how Trump could still win the election: Trump’s favorability differs by polling population type. Among the three groups that appear in pre- (and sometimes post-) election polling–all U.S. adults, registered voters, and likely voters–Trump has received his worst favorability numbers from the country as a whole (all adults). Those numbers then improve as you move to the pool of registered voters, and to likely voters. This trend appeared in mid-December, and has maintained itself a month later: in an average of all 39 post-election polls, Trump has a -8 rating among all adults, -4 rating among registered voters, and -1 rating among likely voters (though keep in mind there were only two polls for the latter category). The entire country viewed Trump more unfavorably than did the slice of Americans that voted, and that split continues to materialize after the election. It avails Trump in elections, when fewer Americans turn out to vote than can express an opinion to pollsters, but hurts him when trying to claim a mandate and support from the American people as a whole.

Tracking Donald Trump’s Falling Favorability

Looking Back On Partisanship and Party Loyalty Trends During the 2016 Election

One of the most important lessons from the 2016 election was more of a reinforcement of what we already knew: the strength of partisanship in shaping vote choice. More recently entering public life as a powerful force and becoming a veritable social identity, party affiliation has been widely understood as the variable most predictive of vote choice. The trend in this dynamic–self-identifying Democrats voting for Democratic candidates and self-identifying Republicans voting for Republican candidates–has grown over time, but the past election cycle seemed primed to test it on the Republican side. Donald Trump ran a campaign rife with sexist marks that would presumably turn off female voters–specifically the white ones that historically vote largely Republican–and racially insensitivity that would in part cause the flight of more educated whites.

There was some movement toward the Democratic column among these groups in 2016 compared to the 2012 election, but not of the decisive type. Most importantly, Trump still won these groups relative to Clinton support. White women voters went Trump 52-43 (+5 net point Democratic gain relative to 2012), and white college-educated voters voted Trump 49-45 (+10 point Democratic gain). These two cases serve as just microcosms of the broader process at play: party identification continued to govern vote choice–in this case voting for Trump–to a large extent. To display the best current measures of party loyalty voting and specifically the percentage of Republicans voting for Trump that we have right now, as well as contextualize those numbers historically, the below graph shows the party loyalty rate among both parties in elections from 1972 to 2016. All data came from the collection of historical exit poll data from various organizations maintained by the New York Times. One caveat to note: exit polls are not of very high quality data, not least because it doesn’t group Independents with the parties to which they lean (I discussed why doing so is important here). Nevertheless, the data here is still meaningful.

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Rates at which partisans vote for their respective party candidates have stayed high but constant among Republicans (with the key exceptions of the 1992 and 1996 elections in which Ross Perot drew Republican votes), but have risen considerably among Democrats. While only 61 percent of Democrats voted for their candidate, George McGovern, in 1972, the loyalty to their own party has grown to a point where the rate hit a peak in 2012, with 92 percent of Democrats voting for Barack Obama.

Of course, in the context of the previous discussion, the critical takeaway here is that partisans stayed very loyal to their parties in during the 2016 election. Most importantly, Trump garnered the support of 90 percent of Republicans, right in line with the loyalty rates his Republican predecessors received.

The path that led to these high, constant loyalty rates did not necessarily go smoothly. As I’ve touched on in the past, there was plenty of movement in intra-party support trends in the months before the election, with Clinton in fact gaining a higher loyalty rate throughout the campaign–though she trailed Trump by one point in this measure in the end according to exit polls. To give a broad overview, the below chart shows both party loyalty and “defection” rates–Clinton/Trump support among both Democrats and Republicans–using all the data that HuffPost Pollster provides on pre-election polling.

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Democrats were much more attached to Clinton even in mid-2015 long before she secured the nomination than Republicans were to Trump. That greater party loyalty rate for one’s own candidate remained higher among Democrats essentially throughout the entire campaign. Nevertheless, both Clinton and Trump see their intra-party loyalty rise particularly around the post-party convention periods in August and thereafter. At that same time, defection rates–represented at the bottom of each of the above grids–declined around this same time.

To get a clearer sense of trends in party loyalty and the strength of partisanship in bringing voters back into the partisan fold, the below graph shows the same trend as the above one excepts it narrows down the time frame down to the start of June–around the time when Trump clinched the Republican nomination with Clinton having already sealed hers.

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There was never too much of a disparity between party loyalty rates, but one thing becomes very clear: Democrats expressed much higher commitment to their nominee in Clinton than Republicans did for their nominee in Trump at every point in the general election season. Loyalty rates among voters in both parties generally have an upward trajectory, but it’s notable that Trump’s loyalty trend fluctuates a bit more. That likely reveals the effects of his various controversies that caused some Republicans to rescind their Trump support but later “come home” to the party and support Trump. Alternatively, these dips in Trump support could signal moments that Republicans responded to polls less because of unfavorable events for their party’s candidate (i.e. their preferences didn’t change, but their response rates did).

Regardless, the point stands that Clinton enjoyed greater party loyalty in polls throughout the pre-election time frame, but partisans came to their candidates at large rates. To sum up the data on party loyalty rates throughout the campaign, here’s a table that shows the average rates by month for each party and clearly quantifies what the data visualizes in the above graphs.

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Source for data: HuffPost Pollster.

After June, Clinton sees greater party loyalty rate the closer the calendar gets to Election Day. At the month level, loyalty rate hit a nadir in August when 80.5 percent of Democrats supported Clinton. Democrats steadily come home to the party thereafter, as in each of the following months more of them express intent to vote for their nominee. That culminates in 87.7 percent of Democrats pledging their vote to Clinton in November before the election (i.e. the average of polls in the final week of the election). On the other side of the aisle, party loyalty fluctuates relatively more for Trump, but his lowest rates occur in the same months that Clinton experienced here: July and August. After gaining more partisans in September and seeing a dropoff in the subsequent month, Trump sees his highest party loyalty rate in November with 84.5 percent of Republicans saying they would vote for him.

It’s worth noting that undecided partisans were included in all of these numbers. The process of these voters coming home to their respective parties increased loyalty rates for both candidates in the end, but when compared to exit poll data–89 percent loyalty rate for Clinton and 90 for Trump–it appears that party loyalty kicked in more for Trump at the ballot box. A comparison between averages of pre-election polls and exit poll data isn’t perfect, but the data suggests that partisanship was a greater force for Trump at the last moments before Election Day. Without these Republicans coming home late in the campaign, Trump likely would not have won the election.

Looking Back On Partisanship and Party Loyalty Trends During the 2016 Election

Calculating Presidential Vote Choice For Oklahoma City, (Probably) The Biggest US City That Trump Won

Vote totals are officially calculated at the state, county, and precinct levels, but not at the city level. There’s been recent discussion on how major cities voted in the 2016 presidential election, and questions about what was the biggest city that Trump won. City-level vote choice can be calculated using tools or data other than the presidential voting data, but all of those make use of precinct level data to build up to city level totals. In the past, I’ve calculated city voting results by looking at city district maps made up of voting precinct names. This gets tedious, and there are better ways to make these calculations. Often times, precinct presidential results come with results for other ballot measures or races. If there are some ballot questions that are specific to a city, one can take those precincts and only look at presidential vote there to get vote choice within only that city.

That’s what I tried to do in calculating the vote choice in Oklahoma City–a potential “big city” victory for Trump. I obtained precinct data for the entire state from the Oklahoma State Election Board. There were 166 different questions on the ballot in Oklahoma during the 2016 November election, and I originally thought a proposition measure–which was called “PROPOSITION NO. 1 (SCHOOL BUILDING MAINTENANCE, SAFETY AND GENERAL EQUIPMENT) OKLAHOMA CITY PUBLIC”–was voted on by the entire city of OKC and only residents in that city. I took the codes of precincts that recorded votes for this measure, calculated vote choice for these precincts, and got a 49.9-43.5 win for Clinton in the city. However, it turns out only portions of OKC–a specific school district–voted on the proposition, and not the entire city (thanks to two reporters from Oklahoma, Laura Eastes and Sarah Stewart, for informing me of this).

Thus, I had to find a new way to narrow down OKC-only precinct names/codes. I called the Oklahoma County and Oklahoma State Election Boards (big thanks to them for the help), and the latter pointed me to results for a 2014 mayoral race in OKC. I was able to get codes for precincts that voted in this election, and thus I was able to get a set of 235 precinct codes for just OKC–only OKC residents voted for the OKC mayoral race. (Side note: Initially, I also assumed that the entirety of OKC was in Oklahoma County–that’s not true, as some OKC precincts are also in Canadian, Cleveland, and Pottawatomie Counties, but this wasn’t a problem with my new approach.) With this new set of data for OKC only, I was finally able to conclude that Donald Trump in fact beat Hillary Clinton in OKC, and not the other way around as I initially calculated. I apologize for this mistake. Thanks for all those on Twitter (especially John Kenney) and Oklahoman reporters and election board workers who helped me correct it. Given Nate Cohn’s collection of vote totals in other cities on Twitter, it seems very likely that Oklahoma City was the most populous (the largest “big city”) that Trump won in 2016, which only comes in as the 27th most populated in the US. Mesa, AZ is likely the next biggest city that Trump won, which ranks as the 38th most populous.  Here’s the final data for OKC:

Trump: 54.1%
Clinton: 39.1%
Total votes: 278,327

Calculating Presidential Vote Choice For Oklahoma City, (Probably) The Biggest US City That Trump Won

The Growth of Political Bubbles

For many, the 2016 election revealed the large degree of geographic and cultural separation within America. While coastal areas and big cities moved more Democratic than they already were, more rural areas and those in the so-called “heartland” of the U.S. turned politically redder than before. Political bubbles have become much clearer in the aftermath of this past election, as it seems as though Americans increasingly interact with and live among others that share the same worldview and political inclinations–creating a sort of political homophily.

I wanted to check this idea of growing political bubbles–which entails people living in more solidly Democratic and Republican areas and fewer living in mixed or “purple” regions–with geographic voting data. I turned to county-level vote totals in the 2008, 2012, and 2016 elections to form margins in favor of either the Democrat or Republican. I used these margins to describe the political environment–the type of bubble–in which voters live.

For example, in this first graph, I did the following for each of the last three elections:

  1. Calculated the percentage point margin separating Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump in each county
  2. Classified every county in 10-point margin increments–Clinton winning by more than 80 points, winning by 70-80 points (expressed as “+70”), all the way to Trump winning by more than 80 points–to create different groups/levels of political bubbles
  3. Summed the total number of voters living in each type of bubble (using total votes cast)

As a guiding example, 13.73 percent of 2012 voters lived in counties where the presidential vote margin was between 10 and 20 points in favor of the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama.

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The most purple types of bubbles–ones in which the margin between the Democrat and Republican is small and thus have many people of opposite parties living in proximity of each other–are located in the center of the above distributions. Where the Democratic margin of victory was between 0 and 10 points, 15.9 percent of 2008 voters, 15.1 percent of 2012 voters, and 12.1 percent of 2016 voters resided. For counties that saw between a 0-10 point close Republican victory, 10.1 percent of 2008 voters, 11.2 percent of 2012 voters, and 9.8 percent of 2016 voters lived there. Thus, fewer voters are living in the most politically diverse counties in the country, with the biggest decrease occurring in 2016–an election with Clinton and Trump as candidates saw fewer counties with mixed vote preferences.

The next most heterogeneous categories in Democrat +10 margin (15.6 to 13.7 to 11.4 percent share of all voters) and Republican +10 margin (10.9 to 10.5 to 8.8) all have fewer voters living in them, with 2016 introducing the largest decrease. So where are all these voters now living? In much more homogeneous counties. Relative to 2012, the Dem +20, Dem +30, Dem +50, Dem +60, and Dem +70 bubbles–areas where the vote is much more homogeneous and befitting of a “political bubble” label–all see increases in number of voters in the 2016 election. On the other end of the spectrum, the same growth of bubbles occurs for every group from Rep +20 through Rep +80. To put this in terms easier to understand, 1.7 percent of 2008 voters lived in counties where McCain won by 50-60 points (+50),  2.5 of 2012 voters lived in counties where Romney won by 50-60 points, and 4.9 of 2016 voters lived in counties where Trump won by 50-60 points. In general, the distribution of voters is becoming flatter across degree of political bubbles–more and more voters now live in counties with an increasingly one-sided blue or red vote.

To better visualize what’s going on (and reduce the number of bubble buckets), below is the same graph but simplified to 20-point margin increments.

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The same story of growing politically homogeneous bubbles materializes. Eight years ago, 26.1 percent of all voters lived in counties where the margin between Democratic and Republican vote shares was less than 10 percent; in 2016, that number has dropped to 21.9. Fewer voters are now living in counties where Democrats won by 10-30 points and 30-50 points, but more voters now live counties that are decidedly blue (by more than 50 points). While 7.5 percent of voters lived in counties that saw a 30-50 point Republican victory in 2008, 13.1 percent of voters now live in this territory. The portion of electorate living in the most Republican counties–50 points or more red–has increased by more than five percentage points as well.

Finally, to measure just total homogeneity and not whether the bubble has a Democratic or Republican bent, the below graph shows where voters live based on absolute differences in major party support (smaller vote margins–such as “0-10 % Diff.”–indicate more heterogeneous political areas and larger vote margins–such as “50+ % Diff.”–indicate more homogeneous areas).

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Slight pluralities of voters still live in more politically mixed counties, but it’s changing. 26.1 percent of 2008 voters and 26.4 percent of 2012 voters lived in counties where the margin between the Democratic and Republican candidates was less than 10 points–only 21.91 of voters did so in 2016. The percentage of voters living in counties with a 10-20 point margin (e.g. where the Democrat won 55 percent and Republican won 40 percent) also dropped from 26.5 in 2008 to 20.2 in 2016. The share of voters living in 30-40 point margin counties grew slowly, but the biggest change occurs at the extreme end: the percentage of voters living in counties where the Democrat or Republican candidates won by more than 50 points grew from 10 in 2008 to 16.8 to 2016. In other words, many more voters are now living in counties that contain very homogeneous vote preferences–either one-sidedly Democrat or Republican. Political bubbles were already starting to grow a bit, but the 2016 election accelerated this process, contributing a clearly observable increase in county-level geographic sorting.


1/14/2017 EDIT:

My pieced was posted over at the Decision Desk (about the same content, but you’ll find graphs you can zoom in on there).

Also, check out the The Crosstab’s post that dives deeper into this topic.

The Growth of Political Bubbles

A Historical and Comparative Perspective on 2016 National Polling Error

I recently co-wrote an analysis of national level polling error in the 2016 election over at The Crosstab. We situate error in national level polls (i.e. estimating popular vote) in the context of historical polling error in the U.S. since the 1980 election, and compare both 2016 error and historical U.S. error relative to national polling for general elections in the UK dating back to 1979. We conclude that national polling has improved and has continued in a strong, high-quality trajectory based on results from the 2016 U.S. election (though the key word here is national–and not state–level polling). Below is one of the key graphs charting polling error for all U.S. elections, all UK elections, and the 2016 U.S. election at each point one year out from Election Day. You can read more about this and the rest of the report here.

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A Historical and Comparative Perspective on 2016 National Polling Error

Charting the Behavior of Leaners vs. Partisans From Self-Described Partisanship

In my own surveys I conduct and analyze as well as outside ones, I always take for granted one thing: that respondents who see themselves as Independent but say they lean toward a certain party resemble generic partisans more than they do independents who don’t lean one way or another. This of course lies at the center of how political science approaches asking about people’s party affiliation. The common practice entails asking respondents to identify with seven (or sometimes five) partisanship groups for a precise but simple categorization scheme–as either “Strong Democrat,” “Weak Democrat,” Democratic-Leaning Independent,” “Pure Independent,” “Republican-Leaning Independent,” “Weak Republican,” and “Strong Republican” (this matches more how surveyors classify responses, as survey-takers don’t see these exact groups, e.g. pure or weak are usually not used in the actual questions).

A wealth of research has shown that Independents who lean toward a major party in fact express a political behavior that closely matches that of regular partisans (strong and weak ones). For example, Independents who lean Democrat vote for Democratic candidates and espouse Democratic issue positions at about the same rates as self-described Democrats do. Given this similarity, Independent leaners are often–but not always–grouped into the parties to which they lean during presentation of survey results (i.e. how question responses break down along party lines).

Notably, these findings help better understand the oft-reported but misleading statistic that Independents are the largest partisanship group. It appears here in a Gallup report, and I first encountered it in an introductory government college course–presented by the professor as a source of hope in a politically divided country. Of course, as political science research shows, many of these Independents act very much like partisans, and thus the fanfare about a plurality of political Independents is seriously misguided.

While I have read some of the literature on this topic, I wanted to test this assumption myself using data, both as a way to see how clear-cut this political finding is (i.e. for purposes of more or less replicating and extending) and considering how important it is to survey analysis. I turn to the American National Election Studies time series data for this, and to see how various measures of political behavior break down among each of the seven party ID groups mentioned above. Specifically, I’m aiming to see how different leaners are from weak and strong partisans, for both major parties.

To give some initial grounding, here is the distribution of partisanship among ANES respondents who said they voted, spanning election years since 1964.

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The first impression this data should give off is the considerable stability in party affiliation of American voters over time. The chart below gives specific numbers on the changing partisanship composition.

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Through the last 50 years or so, the number of strong Democrats–declining from their high in 1964–have come much closer to the number of strong Republicans among those who vote. In general, the landscape of party affiliation–though very stable overall–has generally become more even: the two partisan Democrat groups decrease in percentage while the two partisan Republican groups increase a bit. Leaners for both parties steadily take up a larger share of the electorate over time, while unaffiliated (“pure”) Independents revolve around 10 percent to single digits.

Vote Choice

I first wanted to look at how different party identifiers broke down along the most basic and important of political behavior qualities: vote choice.

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Strong partisans–among Democrats or Republicans–display the highest commitment to voting for their own party’s candidate. However, weak partisans and Independent leaners don’t trail too far behind, especially in more recent years. The average difference in percentage voting Democrat between strong Democrats and weak ones is 18.5 points; it’s a bit smaller between strong and leaner Democrats at 17.3 points. The disparity shrinks down to 12.3 for weak Democrats and 13.5 for leaners in elections since 2000. In the most recent election for which the ANES has data (2012), leaners were much closer to strong Democrats–a difference of 10.1 points in Democratic vote rate–than weak Democrats were–a difference of 15 points. To put it in different terms, 98.1 percent of strong Democrats voted for Obama in 2012, while 83.1 of weak Demcorats and 88 percent of Democratic leaners did. These leaners remain behind strong Democrats regarding party loyalty in vote choice, but both voted for Obama at high rates, and leaners proved more loyal to the party in 2012 than weak Democrats did.

A similar story appears on the other side of the aisle. The difference in Republican voting rates between strong Republicans and weak ones was an average of 14.7 points, and 15.6 points between strong Republicans and Independents who lean red. Defections to Ross Perot in the 1992 and 1996 elections made weak Republicans and leaners less loyal to the party; excluding these two years drops the difference two percentage points in each group (i.e. the two groups are more similar to strong Republicans). In elections from 2000 to 2012, weak Republicans in fact become more loyal to the party at the ballot box (9.1 difference from strong ones) while leaners stay about the same (15.8 difference). However, the difference is smaller for leaners (10.9 points) than for weak Republicans (11.3) in 2012. 96.9 percent of strong Republicans voted for Romney in 2012, while 86 percent of Republican leaners and 85.6 percent of weak Republicans did.

In sum, for both parties, Independent leaners are very similar to weak partisans in terms of vote choice tendency, and not far behind strong partisans in this measure. This type of close similarity offers solid support for grouping leaners, strong partisans, and weak ones when breaking down survey results by party. All three groups have similar vote choice inclinations. Most importantly, the leaners–made up of people who identify as Independent but when pushed reveal a bent toward a major party–are not all that different from self-described partisans.


The results for vote choice comparison should carry the most weight, but below I’ll quickly go through how other political measures break down across these seven partisanship levels.

Ideology

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Political ideology–based on a seven-point spectrum narrowed down to three groups–of voters belonging to different partisanship groups reinforces the conclusion from the previous section: Independent leaners are generally similar to self-described partisans when looking at key political behavior measures. On average in election years from 1972 to 2012, 52 percent of strong Democrats described themselves as liberal, 39.2 percent of weak Democrats did, and 44.2 of Democratic-leaning Independents did. Democratic leaners were about as ideologically left-leaning as most self-described Democrats were. Strong Democrats have consistently grown more liberal compared to the other two groups–proving much more liberal in 2012 than at any point in this time frame–but ideology still remains similar between all these groups.

On the right-wing of the spectrum, all three Republican groups display much greater affinity to their primary ideological orientation–conservatism–than the Democratic groups do with theirs–liberalism. Regardless, ideology among the three Republican groups is similar to some degree. On average, 82.4 percent of strong Republicans saw themselves as conservative, 62.5 percent of weak Republicans did, and 62.4 percent of Republican-leaning Independents did. In this case, the strongest partisans on this side of the aisle are much more conservative than other segments of the party’s base (relative to the Democratic side). All three groups generally trend more conservative over time, though strong Republicans do so at a greater rate. Leaners resemble weak partisans more so in this case, but the point still stands that these Independents–who reveal a lean toward the Republican Party–are much more similar in ideology to generic Republican partisans than pure unaffiliated Independents are.

Government Spending

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The above graph shows the average position on the issue of government spending among the six key groups (excluding pure Independents now). The issue ranged from the most liberal position, that “government should provide many more services/increase
spending a lot,” to the most conservative position, that “government should provide many fewer services/reduce spending a lot.” I coded the question so that it ranges from most liberal at a value of one to most conservative at a value of seven in the graph above.

Strong Democrats are more liberal on government spending and strong Republicans are more conservative on this issue relative to other partisans/leaners. Nevertheless, the Independent leaners match fairly closely the ideology of their respective lean parties, especially that of weak partisans. In election years from 1984 to 2012, strong Democrats average 3.03 on this ideological scale (where lower values mean more liberal), weak Democrats average 3.49, and Democratic-leaning Independents average 3.46. While the strongest partisans are furthest left on this issue, leaners are more liberal than weak partisans. In 2012, the value was 3.14 for strong Democrats, 3.74 for weak ones, and 3.64 for leaners. 2008 also shows that leaners became more liberal than weak Democrats relative to overall averages.

Strong Republicans average to a 4.93 ideological value over this time period (higher values mean more conservative), while both weak Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents average to a 4.55. In 2012, leaners became more conservative with a 5.34 value than weak Republicans did with a 5.02 value–leaners were closer to but still below strong Republicans at 5.49. In other words, leaners on the Republican side were quite ideologically close to regular partisans on the issue of government spending.

Abortion Rights

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Shifting to a more social issue, positions on abortion rights reinforce some of the prior conclusions and add a new wrinkle as well. For this question about when abortion should be allowed, respondents had four different options, ranging from what I considered most liberal at a value of one to most conservative with a value of four (I reverse coded the original values to stay consistent with higher values meaning more conservative):

  1. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.
  2. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established.
  3. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger.
  4. By law, abortion should never be permitted.

Unlike in the previous graphs concerning other measures of political behavior, Independents who lean Democratic are more liberal on the issue of abortion rights than regular self-described partisans in every quadrennial year from 1980 to 2012. On average–where lower values are more liberal on a 1-4 scale–these leaners place at 1.76, while strong Democrats are next most liberal at 2.00 with weak Democrats not too far behind at 2.01. All three groups more or less trend leftward on abortion rights over time. In 2012, leaners remain more liberal (1.51) than strong Democrats (1.66), who in turn have become more liberal than weak Democrats (1.76).

On the Republican side, those most attached to the party–strong Republicans–still remain more conservative on abortion than the other two groups. However, Independents who say they lean Republican aren’t too far behind on this issue in terms of a conservative outlook, and their positions follow very closely those of weak Republicans over time. On a scale from 1 to 4 where higher values indicates a more conservative position, strong Republicans average out to 2.50 from 1980 to 2012, while leaners average 2.22 and weak Republicans average 2.21. In 2012, strong partisans in this group were at 2.68, weak ones at 2.18, and leaners at 2.30. In other words, leaners place very much in line with other Republicans over time and most recently in 2012 on the issue of abortion rights.

Defense Spending

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Finally, to include a more foreign policy-oriented issue (after previously examining economic and social ones), the above figure shows the issue placement of the six key groups on the question of defense spending. Answers ranged on a seven-point scale from what I considered most liberal–greatly decrease defense spending–at a value of one to most conservative–greatly increase defense defense spending–at a value of seven.

All three Democratic groups express very similar positions on the question of defense spending over time. In fact, on a scale where lower values relate to more liberal positions, Independents who lean Democratic average to a 3.72 value in election years from 1980 to 2012–more liberal than strong Democrats (3.80) and weak Democrats (3.92). This phenomenon is not as strong as with the abortion rights issue among Democrats, but still supports the notion of Independent Democratic-leaners falling well within the liberal mainstream–if not more attached to it. Most recently in 2012, leaners again prove more liberal (3.46) than strong Democrats (3.58) and weak Democrats (3.72) on the issue of defense spending.

In the Republicans group, strong partisans are much more conservative than others, but leaners remain fairly conservative and closer to positions of weak partisans. Strong Republicans average to 5.00 on this defense spending scale where higher values mean more conservative, while Independents who lean Republican average to 4.59 and weak Republicans to 4.54. In 2012, leaners (4.68) place ideologically closer to strong Republicans (4.89) than on the average level, with weak Republicans (4.53) further behind. All in all, Republican leaners match fairly closely with regular Republican partisans on the issue of defense spending.


Key Findings 

Across all three of these different issue positions–in addition to vote choice and ideology–one thing becomes very clear: Independents who reveal an inclination to one of the major parties are not all that different from regular members of that party in terms of political behavior. Specifically for the issue positions analysis, one more interesting finding emerged: on the Democratic side, Independent leaners were sometimes more liberal than regular partisans and those with different strengths of attachment (strong vs. weak), and also sometimes less liberal. But on the Republican side, Independent leaners were consistently less conservative than than strong Republicans, and rather very closely matched with weak Republicans in terms of ideology. Relative to ideology on their respective sides of the aisle, Independents who lean Republican are more moderate than Independents who lean Democrat.

The caveat to the issue position examinations pertains to a selection problem: there’s a chance the three issues I chose are actually more aberrant and not as representative as I imply and want them to be. However, I doubt this is the case, in the sense that these represent prominent issues that span three different issue dimensions, and don’t deviate much from what examining vote choice and overall ideology indicate.


This is better suited for another post and analysis, but it’s worth briefly mentioning why Independents like this–who lean toward a party and are quite similar to regular party adherents–exist in considerable numbers. Eschewing party labels and self-descriptions stems from many voters’ distaste with the growing acrimony and gridlock between the two major parties. Expressing partisanship now carries with it socially undesirable connotations for many–whether in social or survey settings. As very interesting research by Samara Klar and Yanna Krupnikov shows, people often feel embarrassed to easily reveal their attachment to a party, and instead opt for saying they’re Independent to make a better impression. For example, in an experimental setting, exposure to partisan disagreement in Washington, D.C. in news stories significantly increased identification as Independent–a scenario that many Americans experience in everyday life. In the article linked above, Klar and Krupnikov say the following:

  • “…our work points to the idea that “independent” has become a socially desirable label – one that conveys a sense of rising above the political pettiness in American politics.”

I think this idea of people wanting to rise above the pettiness of politics rings very true. The experiments the two authors conduct are most convincing for this, but anecdotally, I frequently observe this dynamic in people’s orientation toward politics. It might be more acute for me in terms of my current surroundings of younger Americans in college (and, after all, many of these Independent leaners likely trend younger in age), but I often see people become uncomfortable and put off by political discussion and American politics more broadly. It happens in social settings, in classrooms during discussions and lectures, and on online settings (e.g., Facebook). I’ve come to call it an “above the fray” attitude–the fray being political debate and disagreement. Very often it conveys sanctimony, but at the same time it’s hard to fault these people–and their disaffection–who’ve grown up in a political environment defined by rancor.

Regardless, the important point stands that while the number of self-identifying Independents have increased among the electorate and in the American public, many of these people reveal that they lean toward a certain party and in fact act in many ways like regular partisans. As the research I mentioned above discusses, this phenomenon has many different implications (e.g. damage done to political discourse and engagement), but one of them is not greater independence from party politics. Partisanship remains at one if its highest points in American political history and growing. You just have to ask Independents what side they lean to.

 

Charting the Behavior of Leaners vs. Partisans From Self-Described Partisanship